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Abstract. This natural field experiment tests the effects of purely symbolic awards on
volunteer retention in a public goods context. The experiment is conducted at Wikipedia,
which faces declining editor retention rates, particularly among newcomers. Randomiza-
tion assures that award receipt is orthogonal to previous performance. The analysis reveals
that awards have a sizeable effect on newcomer retention, which persists over the four
quarters following the initial intervention. This is noteworthy for indicating that awards
for volunteers can be effective even if they have no impact on the volunteers’ future career
opportunities. The awards are purely symbolic, and the status increment they produce is
limited to the recipients’ pseudonymous online identities in a community they have just
recently joined. The results can be explained by enhanced self-identification with the com-
munity, but they are also in line with recent findings on the role of status and reputation,
recognition, and evaluation potential in online communities.
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1. Introduction
Wikipedia is an undisputed success story. It is the
largest online encyclopedia, and its content is provided
and curated by voluntary contributors (editors). As
of May 2015, more than 55 million1 registered edi-
tors have voluntarily contributed to this public good.
Wikipedia is the world’s sixth most popular web-
site2 and comprises more than 35 million encyclo-
pedic articles1 in over 280 different languages3 (see
also Greenstein and Zhu 2012). Notwithstanding its
tremendous and surprising4 success, Wikipedia is
severely threatened by declining retention rates, in
particular among new contributors (Wikimedia 2011a,
Halfaker et al. 2013).
Many organizations relying on volunteers face this
problem of attrition. People’s initial motivations may
often not suffice to sustain contributions over the
medium to long run. Voluntary commitments have
become increasingly fleeting because fewer and fewer
volunteers are willing or able to commit to an orga-
nization for an extended period of time (Macduff
2005). This confronts volunteer-dependent organiza-
tions with the challenge of fostering the behavior of
their members without, however, crowding out their
intrinsic and image motivations with the rewards they
choose to employ (see Gneezy et al. 2011 for a discus-
sion of when incentives do and do not work tomotivate
prosocial behavior). The organizations have to strike
a delicate balance between the nature and salience
of the rewards, and the self-determinedness and self-
perception of volunteers (Frey and Goette 1999, Falk
and Kosfeld 2006, Ariely et al. 2009). They can nei-
ther bind their members with contractual agreements,
nor can they pay volunteers in the same way they can
pay employees. Employing small monetary rewards
that accommodate their cash constraint is often even
inferior to using no cash rewards at all (Gneezy and
Rustichini 2000). Nonmonetary alternatives have to be
employed to motivate volunteers to stay.
The existing literature is largely silent on the effects
and potential of purely symbolic rewards, in partic-
ular awards, for prosocial behavior. However, it can
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be observed that throughout history, the provision of
honor to volunteers, for instance with orders of merit,
has played an important role in most if not all soci-
eties. Awards provide an opportunity to “repay” vol-
unteers in a nonmonetary currency that may cater to
their initial motivations (e.g., seeking honor). There are
nowadays plenty of honors given for prosocial behav-
ior, ranging from state honors (e.g., the President’s
Volunteer Service Award in the United States) to dis-
tinctions such as the prestigious Florence Nightingale
Medal given by the International Committee of the Red
Cross, to well-respected awards bestowed by private
organizations, such as the Eagle Palms awarded by Boy
Scouts of America.
These awards are extrinsic, nonmonetary motiva-
tors. In the terminology of Bénabou and Tirole (2003,
p. 504), they correspond to “discretionary” or “ex post”
rewards, as opposed to “promised” or “ex ante” con-
tingent incentives (e.g., innovation prizes). Awards dif-
fer from monetary rewards mainly in that they impose
little material cost on the giver; they do not require
an exact definition and measurement of performance;
they are less likely to crowd out the recipient’s intrinsic
motivation; and they are more suitable for establish-
ing special ties of loyalty and respect between the giver
and the recipient (Frey 2007). The publicity as well as
the selective and official nature of their bestowal, often
involving a prestigious award committee, differentiate
awards from positive feedback, personal praise, and
gift exchange (Gallus and Frey 2017).
Research on awards has only recently gained
momentum in economics and management (e.g.,
Ginsburgh 2003, Besley 2005, Frey 2005, Rablen and
Oswald 2008, Malmendier and Tate 2009, Kosfeld and
Neckermann 2011, Ashraf et al. 2014, Chan et al. 2014,
Neckermann et al. 2014, Gallus and Frey 2016; see Frey
and Gallus 2017 for a survey). It is confronted with
two main problems: the clean identification of causal-
ity in the field, and the isolation of the purely symbolic
dimensions of awards. Merely observing the supe-
rior performance of award recipients does not estab-
lish whether the award had any effect, since juries are
meant to select the candidates who are deemed the
best. True randomization is difficult to institute in the
field because award-giving institutions are reluctant to
relinquish control of the selection process.
The context of Wikipedia makes it possible to exam-
ine the causal effects of awards while ruling out ma-
terial and career-related benefits that awards might
entail; individuals tend to operate anonymously under
pseudonyms (Wikimedia2011b).Most studiesonawards
in the field involve monetary pay, even if only to remu-
nerate subjects for their participation in the experiment.
However, the mere presence of financial rewards may
interact with the award’s effects (Heyman and Ariely
2004). The award given to members of the treatment
group on top of their regular paymay, for instance, add
meaning to the latter. Since thepresent experimentdoes
not involve any transfers of money, such possible inter-
actions of awards withmoney are excluded.
To test the prediction that purely symbolic awards
increase newcomer retention on Wikipedia, a new
award scheme is implemented, with a committee of
senior practitioners to establish the award’s reputation.
Each month, all newly contributing Wikipedia editors
are subjected to a basic screening (to filter out vandals,
for example), after which a fixed number of individuals
are randomly allocated into the treatment group. An
award is posted on their personal page and their name
(i.e., pseudonym) is announced on the official award
page, embedded in a national Wikipedia portal. The
experimental design allows for a straightforward iden-
tification of causality by basic mean-comparison tests.
The study spans more than 11 months and comprises
observations on 4,007 individuals.
The key findings derived from the analysis are that
awards can positively and sustainably impact individ-
ual behavior even if they do not entail any material
or career-related benefits. They seem to be powerful
motivators even if the status increment they produce
is limited to a community the award recipients have
just recently joined; only the award recipients them-
selves know that they are the individuals behind the
pseudonyms that were awarded. The purely symbolic
awards increase the share of editors remaining active
in the following month by 20% (p  0.000). They also
raise the share of authors who continue to directly con-
tribute content to articles by 13% (p  0.017). In contrast
to previous results on gift exchange involving money
(Gneezy and List 2006), the symbolic awards’ effect per-
sists even over longer time periods. The retention rate
among the group of award recipients continues to sig-
nificantly exceed that of the control group in each of
the four quarters following the initial award bestowal.
One possible explanation for the finding that sym-
bolic awards significantly increase retention is that
awards induce their recipients to self-identify as mem-
bers of the community of Wikipedians (a name com-
monly used forWikipedia editors). The results on indi-
rect community work done behind the scenes (e.g.,
coordination and maintenance work) support this con-
jecture; the awards significantly raise the fraction of
newcomers willing to fulfill these tedious but neces-
sary tasks, which are more likely to be assumed by edi-
tors who self-identify with the community (e.g., Butler
et al. 2007, Kittur et al. 2009, Zhu et al. 2012). Other
explanations are provided by recent studies on the
role of status and reputation, recognition, and evalu-
ation potential in online communities. The relevance
of these explanations is supported by anecdotal evi-
dence from recipients’ direct responses to the award
and, in the case of status and reputation concerns, by
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data on social signaling. The persistence of the treat-
ment effect over the year following the intervention is
most likely also supported by success-breeds-success
dynamics triggered by the initial award.
The present field experiment adds insights to the lit-
erature on motivation and rewards in that (i) it is able
to establish the causal effect of awards on their recip-
ients’ subsequent behavior; (ii) monetary and career
related benefits from receiving the award are ruled out;
(iii) the award scheme createdmirrors institutionalized
award schemes as observed in practice (i.e., with regu-
lar intervals, fixed numbers, repeated bestowals over a
long-term horizon, a hall of fame, a reputable jury and
the prestige of a national portal); (iv) the status and rep-
utational capital provided by the award are limited to a
specific community; and (v) newcomers are examined,
who have not yet been socialized in this community.
2. Experimental Setup
2.1. Background on Wikipedia
Over the 14 years since its launch in 2001, Wikipedia
has become an established online information repos-
itory.5 The English and German language versions of
Wikipedia draw more than 10.7 million and 1.2 mil-
lion views per hour, respectively.6 Articles are only one
part of the project, however. Wikipedia is composed of
several areas of activity (called “namespaces”) that cat-
egorize the different contributions editors can make;
grouping for instance all article edits, all file uploads
or all contributions to Wikipedia-related meta issues
(such as policy design). Every single page has its dis-
cussion room (“talk” page) on which editors (called
“users”) can exchange comments and communicate
with each other. Contributors also have a personal user
page where they can introduce themselves to the com-
munity, aswell as a corresponding talk page that serves
as a platform for communicating with others. Contrib-
utors’ activities can thus take many different forms.
To improve quality and fight vandalism, a mul-
titude of standards and rules have gradually been
established. New editors wanting to contribute to
Wikipedia therefore have to comply with an increas-
ingly complex regulatory framework. Noncompliance
with established standards often leads to quick dele-
tion of one’s work, be it by other editors or even by
automated tools (Morgan et al. 2013). Today, newcom-
ers are more likely to be greeted with a warning rather
than a welcome message (Pinchuk 2011), harsh criti-
cism being no exception (Kraut et al. 2012). Although
reverts (deletions) help preserve quality, they substan-
tially decrease newcomers’ willingness to further con-
tribute to the project (Halfaker et al. 2011). Given a
diminishing number of topics that do not yet have a
Wikipedia entry, new editors often have to fit their con-
tribution into an existing article and defend it in front
of more tenured editors keeping watch over their field
of expertise (Suh et al. 2009).
In the German language Wikipedia, where this
experiment is conducted, newcomers’ contributions
even have to be screened and confirmed by estab-
lished editors before becoming publicly visible. As a
result, it can take a considerable time until new editors
see the product of their work appear on Wikipedia.
The German language Wikipedia is the second-oldest
after the English Wikipedia and ranks among the
largest Wikipedia language versions in terms of arti-
cle numbers (more than 1.8 million as of May 2015),
contributors (more than 2.1 million registered accounts
of editors mostly based in Germany, Austria, and
Switzerland),7 and usage (over one million views per
hour).8
2.2. The Experimental Design
“[W]orking closely with practitioners” is listed as one
of the three central advantages of field experiments by
List and Rasul (2010, p. 105). The present study both
lends support to this assertion and emphasizes that
practitioners’ endorsement is most likely to be vital for
any such endeavor. The backing and trust of several
highly reputable community members were central to
this experiment. These contacts were established via
telephone calls, which were followed up by regular
roundtable meetings with a group of editors willing
to tackle the retention problem with the help of the
experiment. They became official founding members
of the project, which was thus institutionalized under
the umbrella of the Swiss national Wikipedia portal,9
providing the award with considerable repute and a
formal character. The award’s official page is displayed
and described more closely in the appendix (see Fig-
ure A.1 for a screenshot of the translated page). The
page briefly describes the award, how it was devel-
oped at several roundtable meetings, andwhat was the
idea behind its creation; namely, to honor new editors
and their valuable contributions to the German lan-
guage Wikipedia. The names (i.e., pseudonyms) of the
Wikipedians behind the program are also given. The
description does not contain any explicit performance
criteria for getting the award, other than that the edi-
tors have made their first contributions to the German
language Wikipedia in the previous month; it is men-
tioned that there were more than 4,000 newcomers as
potential candidates in a given month. The text does
not say that randomization was used to select who out
of the final sample of deserving candidates would win
the award. It also does not announce that the awards’
effects would be evaluated so as to preserve the advan-
tages of a natural field experiment (Harrison and List
2004), i.e., that subjects remain in their natural envi-
ronment and that their behavior is not distorted by
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their awareness of the experiment. Below the descrip-
tive text, the respective month’s list of award winners
is displayed.
The experiment proceeds in four steps (see Table A1
in the online appendix). First, on the sixth of every
month, a data dump of the German language Wiki-
pedia is obtained, where contributors are identified by
an Internet Protocol (IP) address at the time they con-
nect to the Internet, as well as their username and ID
if they register an account on Wikipedia. The author
is responsible for making the decision about whom
to bestow with the first level award (“Edelweiss with
Star”), while the core project members evaluate the
previous winners and out of these select the recipi-
ents for the second and third level awards (2 Star and
3 Star). A computer script is used to identify all new
editors who have made their first edit to an article in
a given month (approximately 3,000) and submit them
to a basic screening, whereby algorithms single out
those editors who are not blocked10 and who have con-
tributed at least twice, with a minimum of five days
between their first and last edit. This increases the
chances that editors actually return to their account
and see that they have received an award (if they
belong to the treatment group).11 Only registered edi-
tors are considered for the experiment;12 “bots” (auto-
mated tools) are excluded.
Second, the remaining editors (approximately 500)
are examined one by one to exclude vandals, adver-
tisers, secondary accounts (“sockpuppets”), group
accounts (including those created by organizations)
and accounts of Wikimedia employees according to a
rulebook developed for this purpose.13 For this step,
an algorithm was developed that flags an editor if spe-
cific keywords are found on his or her user page. Only
editors are retained who have made at least one contri-
bution to an article that is still visible at the day of the
screening, i.e., that has not been deleted, whereby only
articles are considered that are not tagged for deletion
(as, e.g., in Zhu et al. 2013). This careful screening pro-
cess was developed in consultation with experienced
community members. It helps ensure that members of
the resulting pool of candidates would in principle all
deserve a small newcomer award for their first efforts
to contribute to Wikipedia.
From the pool of remaining editors (approximately
370), 150 award recipients are randomly selected (treat-
ment group). In a fourth and last step, on the morning
of the 12th of the given month, the list of winners is
posted on the award’s page and a text accompanied by
a graphic award is placed on the awardees’ talk pages,
informing them that there were over 4,000 newcomers,
i.e., potential candidates, in the previous month (see
Figure A.2 in the appendix). AWikipedia account bear-
ing the name of the award was created for the purpose
of making these posts, which are publicly visible.
The award scheme closely mirrors institutionalized
award schemes as observed in practice, with regu-
lar intervals, fixed numbers, repeated bestowals over
a long-term horizon, a hall of fame, a reputable jury
and the prestige of a national portal; these attributes
clearly differentiate the awards from personal feed-
back and informal rewards, as studied for instance by
Restivo and van de Rĳt (2012, 2014) in the context of
Wikipedia.14
Wikipedia keeps the history of every edit made by
each contributor, including the timestamps. Thismakes
it possible to observe the entire range of activities that
contributors engage in (e.g., correcting or writing arti-
cles, uploading files), including the correspondence
among editors on talk pages.15 Thus, the accurateness
of the performance measurement is close to that in
lab experiments, but the scope of action is not artifi-
cially imposed and even social interaction is allowed for
and taken into account. At the same time, the Internet
context makes it possible to treat each award recipient
equally, whereas face-to-face interactions could be sub-
ject to variability of emotional expressions and inadver-
tent signaling by the researcher.
2.3. Relevant Outcome Variables
General Activity. The dependent variable of interest is
retention, i.e., whether a newcomer becomes active
again in the month following the awarding date—the
“original definition of activity” being that at least one
edit be made in a given month (Wikimedia 2011a, p. 11).
As stated on the Wikimedia research pages, “[t]his
metric has commonly been used [. . .] when examining
the ‘decline’ of participation.”16 In a supplementary
analysis examining treatment effect persistence, the
time horizon is extended to consider the quarters (i.e.,
three-monthly periods) following the intervention. As
a robustness check, the general notion of activity is fur-
ther restricted, ignoring contributions to the project’s
page and to the editor’s own pages so as to make sure
that the results are not driven by merely award-related
communication.
Direct Work on Articles. Retention can also be more
narrowly conceived. The most conservative measure
of retention would exclusively consider article edits as
a form of direct content provision, ignoring all other
activities (as, e.g., coordination work or file uploads).
A binary variable indicates the shares of the treatment
and control groups that remain active in this work
dimension.
To ensure that any treatment effect found in the anal-
ysis (i.e., a higher retention rate among subjects from
the treatment group) is not driven by minor editing
activities, the degree of activity is considered as an
extension. The Wikimedia research team has devel-
oped a categorization of activity levels that can be used
to see whether the award also produces editors who
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aremore active in providing content to articles than are
subjects in the control group. Authors are divided into
four groups according to the number of article edits
they make in the following month: those who become
inactive, those making 1 to 4 article edits, “active”
editors (5–99 article edits), and “very active” editors
(100+ article edits).17
Since the field experiment focuses on newcomer re-
tention, further performance measures are consciously
avoided. In particular, the number of article edits as
such is not used as a variable for the analysis, despite
its favorable property of being a continuous variable.
The measure has several pitfalls (see, e.g., Adler et al.
2008). Most importantly, the experimental treatment
may introduce an asymmetry between treatment and
control groups that inhibits the use of this measure for
the analysis. A person can prepare a whole article and
put it on Wikipedia in one edit, whereas another per-
son may correct minor mistakes in an article and save
each single change, thus generating many more edits.
Each time the save button is hit, one edit is registered.
If the distortions of the edit count measure were dis-
tributed equally among treatment and control groups,
the measure would be flawed, but the comparative
analysis could still be revealing. However, receiving an
award may prompt newcomers to make an effort to
abide by the community conventions, which explicitly
ask each editor to reduce the number of edits made
to a single article by collecting and previewing all the
changes before saving them.18 Thus, the award may in
fact lead to a decline in the number of edits made by
award recipients. The focus on retention (both broadly
and narrowly defined) allows the analysis to circum-
vent the problems related to such performance mea-
surements.
Indirect Community Work. For the discussion of the
results, variables capturing volunteers’ readiness to
fulfill indirect community work help to assess whether
increased self-identification with the community and a
sense of belonging may provide a partial explanation
for the award’s effect on retention. Such “mundane but
necessary” (Lakhani and von Hippel 2003) coordina-
tion andmaintenance tasks behind the scenes are more
likely to be assumed by editors who self-identify with
the community (e.g., Kittur et al. 2009). As the Butler
et al. (2007) survey study suggests, commitment and
identification with a community make contributors
more motivated to fulfill behind the scenes community
maintenance work, which is vital for the community’s
health (see also Ren et al. 2011, p. 77). Zhu et al. (2012)
demonstrate, for the context of Wikipedia, that volun-
teers become more willing to fulfill maintenance and
other unattractive but important tasks if they identify
and feel they belong to the group. To operationalize an
editor’s willingness to fulfill indirect community work,
the “active on talk pages” variable assesses whether
the editor has made any contributions to the talk pages
in Wikipedia. The variable “active on Wikipedia meta
pages” captures whether the editor has been involved
in the organization of the Wikipedia project itself,
designing and discussing policies and guidelines, or
doing other administrative work. Two further variables
measure whether the newcomer has edited his or her
own user page, which is most often employed to intro-
duce oneself to the community, or the personal user
talk page, which is usually used to respond to other
editors’ requests.
Status and Reputation Concerns. A further and re-
lated explanation for why awardsmay affect newcomer
retention is that they lend reputational capital, enhanc-
ing the recipient’s social image and status in the com-
munity. As a proxy for such status and reputation con-
cerns, data on social signaling are used to estimate the
share of award recipients who chose to display the
award more prominently by putting it on their per-
sonal user page.
3. Theoretical Background
It is not clear a priori whether awards have any mean-
ingful motivational effect if they are purely symbolic
and given to newcomers to a community. After all,
awards with no material value are just pieces of rib-
bon. In this experiment, not even ribbons are used; the
award is just a graphic digital symbol.
Research on social identification suggests that being
publicly acknowledged by senior community mem-
bers and being categorized as a valuable contribu-
tor may foster a perception of belonging and self-
identification with the community (see Ren et al. 2011
for an overview of the literature and proposals for
encouraging identity-related commitment in online
communities). Even purely random assignment to a
group can activate social identity and foster unselfish
cooperation (Goette et al. 2006). As Karau andWilliams
(2001, p. 129) suggest in their collective effort model,
strengthening individuals’ social identification with a
group is an effective strategy for enhancing individu-
als’ concern with group outcomes; it enhances liking
of the group (see Kraut and Resnick 2011, who draw
on this model to develop a framework for encourag-
ing contribution to online communities). Applied to
the online context, the result of this increased identifi-
cation and liking is a higher willingness to fulfill less
rewarding coordination and maintenance work (Butler
et al. 2007, Kittur et al. 2009, Zhu et al. 2012). However,
the categorization as a newcomer might also have the
opposite effect and induce award recipients to iden-
tify as outsiders and/or feel inferior to the established
community members.
Another possible and related explanation for why
symbolic awards may foster retention is that they en-
hance their recipients’ status and reputation; i.e., the ben-
efits accruing directly to the individual (“individual
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outcome” in Kraut and Resnick’s 2011 framework). Sta-
tus is an important social need that individuals strive
to achieve (Lindenberg 2013). Award recipients may
make an effort to receive further awards in the future.
Laboratory studies have shown that subjects are will-
ing to incur costs to attain higher status (Huberman
et al. 2004, Charness et al. 2014); they work harder
even if they expect to be only privately informed about
their rank (e.g., Kuhnen and Tymula 2012). Recent field
research provides further support for such concerns
about relative standing (Blanes i Vidal and Nossol
2011), and is even arguing for an inherent prefer-
ence for high rank (Tran and Zeckhauser 2012). Yet,
there is also lab and field evidence for the sometimes-
dampening effects of rank information (see Tran and
Zeckhauser 2012 for an overview).
Moreover, status and reputational concerns in the
voluntary sector differ from those in workplace envi-
ronments. On the one hand, in a public goods con-
text where everyone benefits from the individual’s con-
tributions, informing people that they do better than
average may lead them to conclude that they have
“done enough” and should reduce or discontinue their
involvement (see Chen et al. 2010 for field experimental
evidence from an online community).19 On the other
hand, honoring new editors for their recent contribu-
tions may serve as a cue activating their self-image
as a generous individual, leading to increased iden-
tity investments in the future (e.g., Bénabou and Tirole
2011). When made public, such interventions provid-
ing information about people’s contributions can trig-
ger social image concerns (see Kraft-Todd et al. 2015 for
a survey of related field experiments). In a field exper-
iment in 30 Dutch churches, Soetevent (2005) finds
that removing anonymity significantly increases chari-
table contributions (see also Andreoni and Petrie 2004
and Rege and Telle 2004 on how unmasking contrib-
utors increases public good contributions in the lab).
Yet, most observed effects of identifiability can also be
driven by aversion from shame, which recent exper-
imental evidence suggests can be a stronger motiva-
tion for giving than anticipation of prestige (Samek
and Sheremeta 2014). In the present experiment, how-
ever, shame is unlikely to play a role since subjects use
pseudonyms and the treatment only highlights posi-
tive performance. Somewhat more related, therefore,
is a field experiment by Lacetera and Macis (2010),
showing that medals are effective ex ante incentives
for blood donations—but only if they are publicly
awarded. It is still unclear whether symbolic awards
have a motivating effect if there are no face-to-face
interactions, and if the status and reputational value
they produce is limited to an online community the
person has just started to interact with.
Recognition is a closely related motivational factor
(see, e.g., Bradler et al. 2016 on employee recognition).
It is particularly effective when coming from peers
(see, e.g., Lerner and Tirole 2002 for the case of open
source software development) and when being pub-
lic, in which case it also caters to social image con-
cerns (see Karlan and McConnell 2014 for field and
lab experimental evidence related to charitable dona-
tions). Awards provide public recognition, even when
restricted to an online context; but when awards are
given to new contributors, the recognition does not
come from established peers. It comes from members
of an as of yet unfamiliar community. Nevertheless,
being recognized in the beginning for the first con-
tributions can be an important motivator because it
raises self-confidence and shows that one’s efforts have
a valuable impact on the community’s performance
and outcomes (Karau and Williams 1993, Rashid et al.
2006). Such early recognition by community mem-
bers can moreover motivate recipients to increase their
efforts so as to honor the award.
Evaluation potential theory provides a related and
most basic rationale for why awards may affect behav-
ior in a public goods context: awards signal to their
recipients that their individual inputs are being iden-
tified and evaluated (e.g., Harkins and Jackson 1985;
Karau and Williams 1993, 2001). Award recipients no
longer feel “lost in the crowd” (Latané et al. 1979), but
rather experience that they receive a fair share of credit
for good performance, even though this performance
will be merged with the work done by the millions of
other editors. Yet, if recipients perceive the award and
performance evaluation as obtrusive or even control-
ling, their intrinsic motivation can also be crowded out.
4. Empirical Analysis
4.1. Randomization
At first sight, randomly bestowing awards seems to
be an almost impossible endeavor, because awards are
designed to be given to individuals who excel in their
tasks. However, this experiment shows that it can suc-
ceed if two important conditions are fulfilled. First,
a basic preselection has to exclude obviously unde-
serving candidates, such as vandals. Second, subjects
who by chance do not receive the award should be an
unidentifiable group who ideally are ignorant of the
award’s existence. This is why the higher levels of the
award could not be randomly bestowed. Nonreceipt
of the second-level award risks demotivating people
belonging to the identifiable group of winners of the
first-level award who have made an effort to be hon-
ored again but fail to win. Such a decision can hardly
be randomized.
Randomization has advantages beyond the identi-
fication of a causal effect (Zeitoun et al. 2014). Most
importantly, it prevents biased decisions (e.g., based on
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Table 1. Randomization Check
Treatment Control
(SD; Min; Max) (SD; Min; Max) Difference
A. Performance measures (ex ante)
Total # of edits (mean) 24.10 25.17 −1.07
(64.11; 0; 1918) (62.09; 0; 1026) (−0.53)
# article edits (mean) 17.15 17.41 −0.26
(56.56; 0; 1862) (45.60; 0; 910) (−0.16)
# different articles edited (mean) 7.46 7.07 0.39
(49.43; 0; 1834) (29.07; 0; 834) (0.31)
# talk edits (mean) 2.91 2.66 0.25
(8.71; 0; 113) (9.78; 0; 200) (0.84)
B. Responsiveness predictors
User page self-edited 0.20 0.19 0.01
(SD 0.40) (SD 0.39) (0.391)
User talk self-edited 0.16 0.14 0.01
(SD 0.36) (SD 0.35) (0.308)
Active on talk pages 0.41 0.38 0.03
(SD 0.49) (SD 0.49) (0.089)
N 1,617 2,390 4,007
C. Likelihood of noticing award receipt
Treatment immediacy (in days) 15.19 14.73 0.46
(9.82; 1; 42) (9.95; 1; 78) (1.43)
N 1,612 2,383 3,995
Notes. Values rounded to two decimal places. SD, Min, and Max stand for standard deviation, min-
imum, and maximum, respectively. The t-values are reported in parentheses in the last column of
panels A and C. Differences were estimated with Chi-square tests in panel B, where the last column
indicates p-values in parentheses. For the number of observations (N) in treatment and control groups,
see Table A1 in the online appendix. N is smaller in panel C because some editors’ ex ante edits have
afterwards been deleted and are thus no longer observable.
a jury member’s political hue) and discourages strate-
gic manipulation (e.g., awards given for work on a par-
ticular issue). Randomization hence gives a wide vari-
ety of individuals with different interests and areas of
engagement the chance to be honored and to receive
attention, which is in line with Wikipedia’s concern for
diversity.20
As a randomization check, panel A of Table 1 dis-
plays the t-tests of the observable variables a jury
actively selecting award winners might take as per-
formance criteria (i.e., number of general edits before
awarding date, number of article edits, number of dif-
ferent articles edited, number of talk edits). Panel B
includes Chi-square tests on binary variables that
might predict responsiveness to an award, i.e., if edi-
tors had previously created their own user page,
responded to messages on their talk page, or were
actively participating in discussions on talk pagesmore
generally (for a similar reasoning, see Zhang and Zhu
2011, p. 1609). Panel C shows the t-test of the “treat-
ment immediacy” variable, which predicts the likeli-
hood that editors would notice their award receipt.21
The more days that have passed since an editor’s last
activity, the less likely is the editor to take note if an
award is posted on his or her talk page (e.g., Zhu et al.
2013, Restivo and van de Rĳt 2014).
As expected, before the intervention, the differences
are all negligible, point into different directions, and
are never even marginally statistically significant.22
Before the awarding date, editors in the control and
treatment groups are all similarly productive, they are
equally likely to respond to others, and they are all
similarly likely to detect an award in the event that
one was placed on their talk page. The binary outcome
variables, i.e., whether an editor stays active at all, or
only on article pages, are not included; by definition
they should take the value 1, given that the preselec-
tion only considers newcomers who have made their
first article edit in the previous month.
However, the ordinal variable based on the Wiki-
media Foundation’s categorization of activity levels,
which will be included as an outcome variable, can be
used as a further randomization check (the levels of
activity being 0 article edits, 1–4 article edits, 5–99 arti-
cle edits, and 100+ article edits). A Wilcoxon–Mann–
Whitney test (see Table B1 in the online appendix)
produces statistically insignificant results (z  1.169,
Prob > |z |  0.2426). This again confirms that assign-
ment to treatment and control groups was random.
4.2. Results
The analysis considers eleven awarding rounds, from
September 2012 to July 2013. Each month, 150 new-
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Notes. Focusing on first month after awarding date. Error bars indi-
cate the 95% confidence intervals.
comers received the “Edelweiss with Star” award. As
of May 2015, when the latest data dump was received,
33 editors (2%) from the treatment group and 77 edi-
tors (3%) from the control group had been blocked
since the awarding date and thus dropped out of the
data set. Treatment and control groups therefore com-
prise 1,617 and 2,390 editors, respectively (see Table A1
in the online appendix for an overview of the monthly
cohorts).
Thanks to the random assignment of the treatment,
potential confounding variables are on average dis-
tributed equally between the treatment and control
groups. Hence, basic and clearly interpretable mean-
comparison tests can be used to see whether the award
has a causal effect on retention, both broadly (general
activity) and narrowly (direct article work) defined;
and if so, what the size of the effect is.
General Activity. Figure 1 plots the shares of editors
in the control and treatment groupswho become active
again in the first month after the awarding date. This
basic bar chart indicates that the retention rate is seven
percentage points higher for recipients of the award.
The error bars indicate that the 20% increase in the
retention rate is statistically significant.
Table 2 reports the retention rates in the treatment
and control groups, as well as the differences between
them and the p-values resulting from the Chi-square
tests. Panel A focuses on the most basic measure of
retention, i.e., whether any activity can be observed
after the awarding date. Following Figure 1, the first
row considers the month after the awarding date and
shows that the difference observed in the bar chart
is indeed statistically significant at the 99.9% level
(χ2(1) 18.22, p  0.000).
Row 2 in panel A (Table 2) extends the period of
observation to the two months following the interven-
tion to ascertain that the difference observed in row 1




Active (1st month) 0.42 0.35 0.07∗∗∗
(0.000)
Active (following 2 months) 0.49 0.43 0.06∗∗∗
(0.000)
B. Direct content provision
Active, only article edits (1st month) 0.36 0.32 0.04∗
(0.017)
Active, only article edits (2 months) 0.43 0.40 0.04∗
(0.022)
N 1,617 2,390 4,007
Notes. Average values are rounded to two decimal places. The p-
values from Chi-square tests are reported in parentheses. Adjust-
ments for multiple comparisons using the procedure and code devel-
oped by List et al. (2016) do not change the significance of any of the
tests (see Table B2 in the online appendix).
∗p < 0.05; ∗∗∗p < 0.001.
is not due to a temporal substitution effect, i.e., that
award recipients do not merely advance their next
period of activity to the first month instead of the sec-
ond after the awarding date. The results in row 2 show
that, when considering the two months following the
intervention, the retention rate in the treatment group
still exceeds the retention rate observed in the control
group by six percentage points (49% versus 43%). This
treatment effect of 14% is again highly statistically sig-
nificant (χ2(1)  12.75, p  0.000). The award’s effect
on retention is thus not due to editors resuming their
activity earlier than usual because of the award.
Direct Work on Articles. When restricting the defini-
tion of activity solely to article edits (Table 2, panel B),
the share of award recipients who remain active in this
dimension of work amounts to 36% in the month fol-
lowing the award bestowal; it is four percentage points
higher than the retention rate of 32% observed in the
control group. The award’s causal effect, raising the
retention rate by 13%, is statistically significant at the
95% level (χ2(1)  5.66, p  0.017). As before, extend-
ing the time horizon to the two months following the
intervention still produces a significant difference in
the retention rates of the two groups (43% in the treat-
ment versus 40% in the control group).
The analysis of panel B (Table 2) can be extended to
explore whether the award also produces more highly
active authors. The Wikimedia Foundation’s catego-
rization of activity levels (focusing on article edits) is
used as a basis for this part of the analysis. Figure 2
shows the average marginal effects of the award for
the different levels of article editing activity in the first
month after the awarding date, including the respec-
tive 95% confidence intervals. As can be seen in Fig-
ure 2, the award’s effect on retention is not driven
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Notes. First month after awarding date. Error bars indicate 95% con-
fidence intervals. The figure extends row 1 of panel B in Table 2 and
shows the treatment effect at each level of article editing activity.
only by minor article editing activity; the share of new-
comers who remain active is significantly increased at
every level of activity (1–4 edits; 5–99 edits; and ≥100
edits). Figure 2 thus illustrates that the award not only
lowers the attrition rate of new authors (as seen in
panel B of Table 2 and in the “inactive” category in
Figure 2); it raises the share of editors at every level of
activity.
The limitations of the edit count metric have been
mentioned above, but transforming the measure into
an ordinal variable mitigates the distortionary ten-
dencies and helps ascertain that the award’s effect on
retention found in panel B of Table 2 is not due to
only minor article editing activity. A Wilcoxon–Mann–
Whitney test (see Table B3 in the online appendix) also
shows the statistical significance of the finding that the
treatment group tends to have larger values on the
ordinal “degree of activity” variable than the control
group (z-value−2.470, Prob > |z |  0.0135).23
Treatment Effect Persistence. The focus of the analy-
sis lies on the first month after the awarding date, for
two main reasons. First, four weeks is a long time hori-
zon in the Internet context, where the first 24 hours
are highly predictive of an editor’s future engagement
(e.g., Panciera et al. 2009, Morgan et al. 2013). Previ-
ous research on gift exchange has shown that posi-
tive effects initially found vanished after the first cou-
ple of hours (Gneezy and List 2006). If the award
scheme prompts more newcomers to return, this pro-
vides an opportunity for other community members
to get in contact and involve them more thoroughly
in the community. Second, and related, recent work
on success-breeds-success dynamics in online commu-
nities, including on Wikipedia, suggests that positive
public peer feedback leads to cascades of positive rein-
forcement by other community members (van de Rĳt
et al. 2014; see also Kraut and Resnick 2011, p. 52).
It therefore becomes increasingly difficult to look at




Quarter 1 0.52 0.47 0.05∗∗
(0.002)
Quarter 2 0.34 0.31 0.03∗
(0.032)
Quarter 3 0.27 0.24 0.03∗
(0.031)
Quarter 4 0.26 0.23 0.03∗
(0.037)
Quarter 5 0.21 0.20 0.02
(0.221)
N 1,617 2,390 4,007
Notes. Average values rounded to two decimal places. The p-values
from Chi-square tests are reported in parentheses. The two higher-
level awards, which are not randomly bestowed, fall into quarters
one and two; they could be received after months 2 and 5 after the
initial award whose effects are being tested. The scheme includes no
further awards thereafter.
∗p < 0.05; ∗∗p < 0.01.
the direct effect of the award as the time horizon is
extended, also because some editors receive further
awards over time. Notwithstanding this cautionary
note, a supplementary analysis further extending the
period of observation is helpful to get an indication
of whether the difference in retention rates between
the treatment and control groups also persists over
the long term. Since the focus on article edits ignores
important forms of contribution, such as coordination
work which is crucial for the health of the community,
the analysis of treatment effect persistence again con-
siders general activity (as in Figure 1 and panel A of
Table 2).
Table 3 shows that, when considering the retention
rates in the quarters following the initial award, the
difference between treatment and control groups per-
sists and remains significant until and including the
fourth quarter after the intervention. Whether on its
own or together with reinforcing feedback dynamics,
the award provokes an increase in the retention rate
by 11% (from 47% to 52%; χ2(1)  9.51, p  0.002), 10%
(from 31% to 34%; χ2(1)  4.61, p  0.032), 13% (from
24% to 27%; χ2(1) 4.67, p  0.031), and 13% (from 23%
to 26%; χ2(1)  4.33, p  0.037) in quarters 1, 2, 3, and
4, respectively, after the intervention. The difference in
quarter 5 still points into the expected direction but it
is no longer significant (χ2(1) 1.50, p  0.221).
There is so far only limited evidence on the post-
intervention persistence of treatment effects in the
context of voluntary public goods contributions. The
related field experiments that do consider long run
post-intervention implications (six months and longer)
mostly study treatments targeted at charitable giv-
ing (e.g., Meier 2007, Shang and Croson 2009, Landry
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et al. 2010), and environmental conservation interven-
tions using household-level social comparison mes-
sages (Ferraro et al. 2011, Ferraro and Price 2013,
Allcott and Rogers 2014). The results of these stud-
ies are mixed; while in some cases the effects persist
after the treatment’s discontinuation, in other cases
they vanish or even turn into negative net effects, for
instance due to motivation crowding-out. Figuring in
the nonnegligible costs of some of the interventions,
the overall evaluation can become very negative. Sym-
bolic awards are a low-cost intervention. The basic test
in Table 3 helps ensure that the positive effect found
in the first month after the intervention is not reversed
later on. The finding that the retention rate in the treat-
ment group continues to lie significantly above that in
the control group in each of the following four quar-
ters indicates that awards have the potential to trigger
a dynamic that fosters retention over the long term.
4.3. Discussion
There are various mechanisms through which awards
can have a positive effect on newcomer retention,
besides the external reinforcement produced by suc-
cess-breeds-success dynamics. The following dis-
cussion considers four major explanations, without
disentangling their relative importance: enhanced self-
identification with the community, status and reputa-
tion concerns, recognition, and evaluation potential in
online communities.
Enhanced Self-Identification with the Community. Wiki-
pedia editors’ willingness to fulfill mundane but im-
portant coordination work behind the scenes is taken
as a proxy for their self-identification with the com-
munity (in line with, e.g., Butler et al. 2007, Zhu et al.
2012). Table 4 presents results on four central mea-
sures that reflect whether newcomers are willing to
Table 4. Social Identification
Treatment Control Difference
(1) (2) (3)
Indirect community work (1st month)
Active on talk pages 0.19 0.13 0.07∗∗∗
(0.000)
Active on Wikipedia meta pages 0.08 0.06 0.02∗
(0.012)
User page self-edited 0.07 0.04 0.03∗∗∗
(0.000)
User talk self-edited 0.08 0.04 0.04∗∗∗
(0.000)
N 1,617 2,390 4,007
Notes. First month after awarding date. Average values rounded to
two decimal places. The p-values from Chi-square tests are reported
in parentheses. Adjustments for multiple comparisons do not change
the significance of any of the tests (see Table B2 in the online
appendix).
∗p < 0.05; ∗∗∗p < 0.001.
assume such maintenance work and actively engage
with the community. Row 1 shows that the award
increases the share of newcomers willing to coordinate
with others on talk pages, for instance discussing arti-
cle content or rules, by about 50% in the month fol-
lowing the intervention (from less than 13% to more
than 19%; χ2(1)  32.85, p  0.000). The second row
indicates that the award also increases the share of
editors who participate in the organization of the
Wikipedia project, developing guidelines and fulfill-
ing administrative tasks, by 33% in the first month
after the intervention (from 6% to 8 %; χ2(1)  6.34,
p  0.012). The share of newcomers who self-disclose
and introduce themselves to the community on their
personal user pages is raised by 75% (from 4% to 7%;
χ2(1) 18.97, p  0.000; see row 3), thus providing oth-
ers with greater opportunities to contact them (e.g.,
based on the fields of interest indicated on the per-
sonal page). Compared to the control group, twice as
many award recipients respond to others’ requests on
their talk pages and thus enter in direct contact with
community members (8% versus 4%; χ2(1) 34.17,
p  0.000; see row 4). These results indicate that
enhanced self-identification as a community member
may be one important reason why the awards have
such a significant effect on newcomer retention.
Status and Reputation Concerns. Another possible ex-
planation for the awards’ effect on retention is that
they lend reputational capital to newcomers, even if
that capital is restricted to the online community. To
understand whether status and reputation concerns
provide a pertinent explanation, data on award recipi-
ents’ choice to more prominently display the award by
putting it on their personal user page are collected. As
of May 2015, 58 award recipients from the 11 awarding
rounds had put a small template (called “Babel”) that
had been created by a recipient of the first wave (see
Figure A.3 in the appendix) onto their user page; 43
had copied the award graphic or both the graphic and
the entire text (Figure A.2 in the appendix) to display it
there (7 among them also included the small template).
Hence, 94 winners (5.8%) had chosen to display their
receipt of the award more prominently on their user
page. This number provides a lower-bound estimate of
the relevance of reputation and status concerns; many
individuals can be expected to refrain from engaging
in active social signaling for fear of diluting the signal
of merit.
Recognition. Awards signal to their recipients that
their contributions and effort are being recognized
and considered valuable by others. In particular for
newcomers, such recognition can raise self-confidence
in a critical learning phase marked by uncertainty.
Although the experimental setup does not allow the
single mechanisms accounting for the awards’ motiva-
tional effect to be isolated, anecdotal evidence suggests
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that recognition and enhanced self-confidence are rel-
evant explanations. Several award recipients referred
to their feeling of being recognized in their response
to the award, which they posted on the award talk
page or on their own talk page. Some exemplary quotes
are as follows: “Thank you very much for the recogni-
tion. I will continue [contributing]!” (in February 2013);
“Thank you very much. I have spent much time with
Wikipedia. The recognition for this [effort] makes me
very happy” (April 2013); “I feel very honored to
receive this award. It makes me realize that contri-
butions, even if they may be small, are recognized
here” (December 2012); or “Dear friends in Switzer-
land. I thank you most warmly for this recognition. It
is nice that my contributions are positively taken note
of in Switzerland. Thanks and kind regards to the Con-
federates” (in August 2013). The recognition provided
by the awards may also strengthen their recipients’
confidence and encourage them to embark on more
demanding projects, as the following exemplary quote
suggests: “Dear Edelweiß-Team, as an absolute new-
comer I am very delighted about this award! I initially
only wanted to make a few corrections every now and
then, but this form of welcoming has highly motivated
me! I am now working on my first article . . . Many
heartfelt thanks in retrospect!” (from September 2012;
emphasis in original). Although the wording of the
award scheme on purpose omits any reference to
future expectations, some responses indicate that the
recognition provided leads some recipients to want
to honor the award and live up to perceived expecta-
tions: “Hello Portal Switzerland, a heartfelt Merci viel-
mal [Swiss German for “many thanks”] for the award,
which makes me tremendously happy! I will do my
best to live up to the honor. Best regards, [. . .]” (Novem-
ber 2012; as before, author’s translation).
Evaluation Potential. Related to the recognition-based
explanation, awards also signal to their recipients that
their individual inputs for the common good are being
identified and evaluated. Recipients no longer feel “lost
in the crowd” and instead experience that they receive
credit for their inputs. The relevance of this explanation
is supported by responses illustrating that some indi-
viduals clearly attribute their award receipt to specific
contributions they have made, which they perceive to
have been evaluated. For instance, one recipient wrote
to his mentor: “[. . .] I received an award from the Portal
Switzerland for my first article (Edelweiss with a Star)!!
I want to thank you most warmly for mentoring me,
since I would not have succeeded in writing the article
like that without your help during my first Wiki-steps.
As such, a petal of the edelweiss belongs to you; just
choose one. Again, thank you and I look forward to our
future cooperation!” (from September 2012; emphasis
added).
All four explanations—social identification, status
and reputation concerns, recognition, and evalua-
tion potential—seem to be important in explaining
the motivational effects of symbolic awards. Future
research could usefully inform the design of awards
by examining the conditions under which the single
mechanisms become more or less important. It could
also differentiate the relevance of the mechanisms
according to different types of award recipients (e.g.,
based on the degree of previous contributions, senior-
ity, age, gender, professional background), and analyze
who is most responsive to receiving symbolic awards.
4.4. Robustness
Two additional binary activity variables are created to
ascertain that the central result, that symbolic awards
significantly increase newcomer retention (Figure 1),
is not merely driven by award-related communication.
In line with the analysis in panel A of Table 2, the
two variables record any type of activity. However, the
first alternative variable for measuring general activity
ignores contributions to the award project’s page, and
the second variable goes even further in that it also
omits edits to the editor’s own user and user talk pages.
Panel A in Table B4 of the online appendix presents
the results from the Chi-square tests which compare
the means of editors who stay active in the month
following the awarding date. Excluding the award
project’s page (row 1) does not change the results
from row 1 in panel A of Table 2. This suggests that
award recipients who post a thank you note on the
project’s page alsomake other contributions. Addition-
ally excluding editors’ own pages somewhat reduces
the effect, but still shows a difference of five per-
centage points, which is highly statistically significant
(χ2(1)  11.95, p  0.001; row 2 in Table B4, panel A).
The treatment’s positive effect on retention is hence
not produced simply by communication on the award.
A causal effect of the award on retention can be estab-
lished evenwhen applying very conservativemeasures
of activity, such as that in row 2 of Table B4 or the
one that only considers direct edits to articles (Table 2,
panel B).
Focusing on the more restrictive measure of activ-
ity (as in row 2 of Table B4), which excludes the
award project’s page and editors’ own pages, panel B
of Table B4 considers the robustness of the findings on
treatment effect persistence. Panel B shows that using
this conservativemeasure of activity leaves the original
findings from Table 3 unchanged, i.e., the difference
between the treatment and control groups persists in
the four quarters following the intervention, and ceases
to be significant in the fifth quarter after the awarding
date.
Notwithstanding their robustness and statistical sig-
nificance, the findings from this first study on purely
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symbolic awards and volunteer retention have to
be interpreted with caution. p-values are not the
sole provider of inferential information; the statistical
power of the test and research priors also need to be
taken into account. Based on these variables, Maniadis
et al. (2014) present a model to calculate the post-study
probability (PSP) that a research finding is indeed true.
The PSP equals the number of true associations which
are declared true divided by the number of all asso-
ciations which are declared true. Since some of the
variables are difficult to specify exactly, it is useful to
consider a number of combinations of them to provide
meaningful ranges for the PSP. With an α error proba-
bility of 0.05 and a power (1−β) 0.99,24 a conservative
prior probability (pi) of 0.01 yields a PSP of only 0.167.
However, if the prior (pi)  0.05, the PSP is 0.510 and
thus crosses the 50% threshold. The PSP for prior pi
values of 0.10, 0.20, 0.35, and 0.55 is 0.688, 0.832, 0.914,
and 0.960, respectively.25 As this illustrates, the PSP is
increasing in the prior pi. We should hence be cautious
not to make overly strong inference from novel and
surprising experimental results, even if they are statis-
tically significant. As the framework in Maniadis et al.
(2014) highlights, already a few independent replica-
tions tremendously increase the PSP.
5. Concluding Remarks
Although research on the motivations for private con-
tributions to public goods is extensive, little is known
about the rewards that help sustain volunteers’ con-
tributions without crowding out their intrinsic moti-
vation. Awards such as orders and medals of valor
are symbolic rewards that may foster such voluntary
contributions. They are certainly a widespread phe-
nomenon. However, any investigation into their causal
effects is hindered by their juries’ unwillingness to see
their authority replaced by random decision-making
processes.
This study presents a large-scale natural field exper-
iment in which an award scheme with fixed intervals
and award numbers is institutionalized and random-
ization is employed to establish clear causal effects of
awards on voluntary contributions to the public good
Wikipedia. The experiment addresses one of the online
encyclopedia’s most serious challenges, the retention
of new editors. It explores whether purely symbolic
awards can be used to increase newcomer retention,
even if the status and reputational capital they provide
are limited to an online community the award recipient
has only recently joined.
The award scheme is shown to have a consider-
able and statistically highly significant effect on reten-
tion. The share of newcomers who remain active in
the month after the awarding date is seven percent-
age points higher for the treatment group than for
the control group. This is a 20% increase in the reten-
tion rate (p  0.000), from a share of 35% to one of
42%, which is not driven by a temporal substitution
effect or by award-related communication.When solely
considering direct contributions to articles, the award
also increases the fraction of newcomers who remain
active, resulting in a difference of four percentage
points between treatment and control groups. The 13%
increase (from 32% to 36%, p  0.017) is not driven by
minor editing activities; the award increases the shares
of authors at all three commonly considered activity
levels.
A supplementary analysis of treatment effect per-
sistence indicates that the difference in general reten-
tion rates observed between control and treatment
groups continues to be significant over the four quar-
ters after the intervention; it becomes insignificant
thereafter. The discussion considers four main expla-
nations for the motivational effect of the symbolic
awards: increased self-identification as a community
member, status and reputational concerns, recogni-
tion, and evaluation potential. Additional data (e.g., on
social signaling) as well as anecdotal evidence support
the relevance of these explanations. Recent research
on success-breeds-success dynamics in online com-
munities furthermore suggests that external reinforce-
ment triggered by the award (e.g., additional positive
feedback, lower reversion rates) may provide another
important explanation, in particular to account for the
treatment effect’s persistence.
The findings are worth noting not only because the
award is costless and has no material implications,
but also because it is given to newcomers who oper-
ate under pseudonyms that they have only recently
adopted. Previous research (Restivo and van de Rĳt
2014) has suggested that “rewardsmay [. . .] be counter-
productive for [editors] who are not already suffi-
ciently embedded within the core contributor commu-
nity” (p. 459), warning that they can even lead to lower
retention. The present study follows the authors’ call
for further investigation and shows that even new com-
munity members can be positively motivated by sym-
bolic rewards, if these convey meaningful signals of
appreciation. The estimates are conservative since non-
responsiveness to the interventionmay be due not only
to indifference, but also to unawareness, since some
recipients simply do not (or only belatedly) return to
their user page and thus do not see that they have
won an award (Panciera et al. 2009, p. 55; Morgan et al.
2013, p. 5).
The analysis focuses on the treatment’s effect on
newcomer retention and does not consider any pos-
sible spillover effects of the award. These are most
likely to affect senior editors, since work on Wikipedia
is highly content-oriented26 and repeat social interac-
tion, if it occurs, tends to take place between new-
comers and more experienced editors who help them
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and answer their questions. The positive effect the
award might have on these third parties is exempli-
fied by the quote referenced in the discussion section,
where an award recipient thanks his mentor. Just as
such additional positive effects are not captured in the
evaluation of the award, potential negative effects on
nonrecipients are also not considered. However, these
can be expected to be negligible or even nonexistent,
since other newcomers are most likely unaware of the
award’s existence. Moreover, there is no list showing
specifically which editors were considered and left
without award.
While these considerations suggest that the award
program’s beneficial impactmaywell exceed the effects
found in this analysis, two limitations should also be
noted. First, the value of awards hinges on their rar-
ity; they have to be used sparingly to prevent infla-
tionary tendencies. Awards should therefore be inte-
grated into a broader reward scheme (also including,
e.g., thank you gifts and communal events), alongside
other forms of providing recognition (e.g., personal
praise), to increase retention rates. A promising avenue
for future research will be to explore the relationship
between awards and other rewards, and that between
the value of an award and the quantity and frequency
with which it is bestowed. Varying other award param-
eters, such as the degree of publicity, and considering
which volunteer groups are most responsive to sym-
bolic awards would be of equal interest.
A.1. Official Award Page (Author’s Translation)
.
Note. “XYZ” is a placeholder for the pseudonyms of the award winners, which are displayed there.
Second, the experiment is conducted in an anony-
mous online context. As noted by Zhang and Zhu
(2011, p. 1613), an interesting direction for future
research will be to examine the findings’ generalizabil-
ity to nonvirtual fields and other public goods con-
texts. However, the results as they stand are impor-
tant given the increasing penetration of the Internet
into professional and private spheres. The finding
that anonymous newcomers to an online community
are motivated by attention and public social recogni-
tion is important and should receive further attention
by researchers. It may inform policies dealing with
anonymity and its impacts on individual behavior.
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Appendix. The Award
The design of the award page was modeled on that
of the Swiss national Wikipedia portal, the banner of
which is prominently displayed on top of the website (see
Appendix A.1). The award and a link to its page also appear
on the front of the Portal Switzerland page. The text on the
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A.2. Award Template Inserted on User Talk Pages (Author’s Translation)
.
A.3. Babel Template (Author’s Translation)
.
award page briefly describes the award and the idea behind
it, without giving any details on performance criteria other
than the condition that the editors have each made their first
contributions to the German language Wikipedia in the pre-
vious month (what kind of contribution is not defined). The
aim of the award is declared, i.e., “to honor new [editors]
and their precious contributions to the German language
Wikipedia. They deserve our thanks and recognition.” The
names of some of the team members are provided so that
questions, suggestions or criticism can be directed to them.
The page mentions that there were more than 4,000 newcom-
ers in the previous month, and then displays the month’s
lists of recipients of the 1, 2, and 3 Star awards, as well as a
link to the lists of former recipients (similar to a hall of fame).
On the bottom of the page, a small template (called “babel,”
Appendix A.3) that was created by a recipient of the first
wave is offered for those interested to copy and put it onto
their personal user page.27
The award that is put on recipients’ talk pages resem-
bles a medal and displays a Swiss national symbol (an edel-
weiss flower) and a golden star, adorned by a laurel wreath.
The text informs its recipients that there were more than
4,000 newcomers in the previous month (see Appendix A.2).
Award recipients usually post their reactions underneath the
award on their talk page or on the project’s talk page. Some
put the babel or the entire award graphic on their user page.
Endnotes
1https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/List_of_Wikipedias#Grand_Total
(accessed May 24, 2015).
2http://www.alexa.com/siteinfo/wikipedia.org?range5y&size
large&yt (accessed May 24, 2015).
3https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/List_of_Wikipedias (accessed
May 24, 2015).
4The puzzle that the existence of privately provided public goods
poses to theory has intrigued economists for a long time (e.g., Olson
1965). Many analyses have been devoted to the motivations under-
lying such prosocial behavior, and there is now a rich literature
building on behavioral research (Gaechter 2014 presents the central
findings of recent research on prosociality). Studies focusing onmoti-
vations to contribute to online public goods are, for example, Benkler
(2002), Lerner and Tirole (2002), and Lakhani and von Hippel (2003).
Von Krogh and von Hippel (2006) provide a useful review.
5Collaborations between Wikipedia and prestigious research and
state entities are no exception (Butler 2008). In 2008, The Economist
(2008) argued: “IT IS the biggest encyclopedia in history and themost
successful example of ‘user-generated content’ on the internet.”




8http://stats.wikimedia.org/DE/ (accessed March 31, 2015).
9Wikipedia portals coordinate work on specific topics related to the
respective portal’s thematic focus.
10See, for example, Choi et al. (2010, p. 110): “Some users were
blocked by Wikipedia because of their vandalistic edits [. . .]. We
excluded those users.”
11This condition drastically reduces the size of the subject pool since,
as shown by Panciera et al. (2009, p. 55) for the English Wikipedia,
roughly “60% of registered users never make another edit after their
first 24 hours.”
12 IP addresses are often not permanent. They identify a specific
device whereas the same person may contribute via various devices.
Moreover, they can map to multiple computers in a network (e.g.,
in an office) or to a single but public computer, which is used by
different persons (Zhang and Zhu 2011).
13This is in line, for example, with Walling and Taraborelli (2012),
who also “exclud[ed] to the best of [their] knowledge sockpuppets
and other categories of spurious accounts.”
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14The authors study barnstars, which are widely used informal peer-
to-peer rewards in the English Wikipedia that any one editor can
freely and spontaneously give to others. In their experiments, the
tokens were distributed anonymously (2014) or by a self-declared
“not very active” account (2012), all in a single spell. The authors
focus on core contributors (the top 10% most productive editors)
who have never received such a token despite their high levels of
contribution. The two studies yield vastly mixed results. While the
top 1% most productive editors respond positively to receiving a
barnstar, the editors in the 91st to 99th percentile range do not alter
their productivity; the barnstars even provoke a decrease in retention
among those core contributors.
15Only the correspondence via email is not observable. How-
ever, emails only constitute a minor fraction of the correspon-
dence, as becomes evident, for example, by the following advice:
“In general, you should not expect Wikipedians to contact you by
email. Instead, check back to the talk page periodically to see if
your question has been answered” (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Wikipedia:Researching_with_Wikipedia, accessed May 20, 2013).
16http://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Research:Metrics/survival(t)
(accessed May 28, 2013).
17See http://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Research:Metrics (accessed
June 7, 2013).
18The following illustrates the convention: “It is strongly recom-
mended that you use [the Show preview button] before saving [. . .]
Saving the same article several times in quick succession makes
it harder for people to check what changed, and clogs up the
page history” (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Help:Show_preview,
accessed June 18, 2013).
19As Thaler and Sunstein (2008, p. 69) admonish, “If you want to
nudge people into socially desirable behavior, do not, by any means,
let them know that their current actions are better than the social
norm.”
20“Wikipedia also needs more different Wikipedians [so as to]
increase the quality and completeness of the encyclopedia [as well
as] the likelihood that any new member of the community will find
like-minded collaborators and feel like they fit in” (Morgan et al.
2013, p. 8).
21 It is not possible to see which editors actually visit the website
and see their award. People can visit Wikipedia pages without being
logged in to their profiles; even when they are logged in, the pages
that they look at without making an edit are not recorded in the
data set.
22Apower analysis indicates that even a small effect of 0.2 (see Cohen
1988) would be detected, if it existed, with a probability of 0.9999975
(one-tailed) given the sample size of the two groups and an alpha
error probability of 0.05.
23Mann–Whitney only allows one to draw conclusions about the
statistical significance of the test. For the effect size, ordered logit
is used. The proportional odds ratio of comparing subjects of the
control groupwith award recipients on the level of activity is 1.17764
(Prob > |z |  0.014), the cut-points being 0.7351199, 1.708068, and
3.925069. This means that the odds of high activity (i.e., four or more
edits) versus the combined lower categories of activity are 1.18 times
greater for subjects in the treatment group.
24With a sample size of 4,007 and an α error probability of 0.05, a
power calculation indicates that (1− β) > 0.999.
25Note that these results can be simply derived from the basic frame-
work in Maniadis et al. (2014, p. 284, Equation (1)) since the number
of independent researchers exploring the question (k)  1 for the
present study.
26As is stated in the description of talk pages, “The purpose of
all talk pages is the improvement of Wikipedia as an encyclope-
dia” (https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Diskussionsseiten,
accessed June 5, 2015; author’s translation).
27Editors frequently display such templates on their user pages
to provide information on their language skills, for instance.
See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Babel (accessed June
27, 2013).
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